Leo Horovitz

Leo Horovitz is the part of Le(hoo)o that thinks and writes down his thoughts…

Look at the bulk of his output over here although he also writes the META part of the site.

His counterpart is Lehooo.

These are his latest posts:

“Do Scientists Fear the Paranormal?”

I’ve decided to finally start blogging as opposed to simply posting links with commentary on Facebook. I’ll continue to post links on Facebook when I don’t have anything substantial to say of my own and you can follow my Facebook profile if you want all of that (but I only accept friend requests from people I actually know). Whenever I find myself writing a longer commentary such as this, though, I’ll post it as a blog post on this website instead. Oh, and I think there will be some posts containing only my views and/or opinions on some subject matter not directly connected to blog posts or articles from other websites.

For those of you who are merely following this website for the comics and illustrations, I suggest you start following the Art sub site only (the RSS-feed for that can be found here), subscribers to the main feed will start getting my blog posts, articles and other content in addition to my artwork. If, on the other hand, you have just now found your way here and are only interested in my writings and don’t want updates about my artwork, then subscribe instead to the Thoughts feed. If you want the complete Lehooo Experience, then by all means, continue subscribing to the main feed!

Now, on to the subject at hand!

An blog post was published on the Tech/Social Media/misc blog Mashable with a (for the blog) rather uncharacteristic (at least in my experience) subject. It tackles the question of whether so called paranormal phenomena and research claiming to find empirical support for it is being ignored by the scientific community.

The article is titled Do Scientists Fear the Paranormal? and here follows my take on it and the subject it treats.

This question in the title is, of course, ridiculous taken at face value, but it is probably designed to catch the attention of potential readers. The content, on the other hand, leaves little if anything to be desired. It’s a rational, calm description of the way that science progresses. It’s an article clearly on the side of the scientists who, quite rightly, remain skeptical of far reaching claims of extraordinary, as of yet undocumented phenomena until the experiments purporting to contain evidence for the aforementioned phenomena can be replicated again and again by other scientists. This is how science works, and it works. There are no alternatives to the scientific method for checking if hypothetical entities have real world counterparts.

The article is a well written take on the preposterous claim that scientists “refuse to acknowledge research that challenge their worldview”. If they did, the immense progress made in science with its countless overthrows of previously favorite theories in favor of new ones in better agreement with observable results, would not have been possible.

It remains to be seen is such sober descriptions will convince those who see a great conspiracy to silence the dissenters and maintain the status quo, but of this, as with the existence of paranormal phenomena, I remain highly skeptical…

Stance on Religion and Faith

Like the article on my philosophical statement, this is a evolving document of my thoughts and views on a particular subject, in this instance, it’s religion.

It’s hard to give a catch-all definition of religion, but in order to exclude secular philosophy, rituals and traditions, I feel it’s necessary to include an element of something supernatural or at least something that is separate from the material world and anything that somehow emerges from it, in the definition. What I mean by this is that any philosophy that does not include the existence of something immaterial or “transcendent”, and any tradition or ritual that is not performed with the presumption that it enables one to connect with any such thing, does not qualify as religious. This definition probably needs to be augmented to say that this supernatural or trancendent thing needs an intentional or teleological aspect, something that means that there is a purpose embedded into reality. Going by this, it’s safe to say that science has not been able to detect any such agency in nature, progress in understanding observable reality has been such that more and more is explained in mechanistic terms, and the trend seems to continue. Connecting this with my views on philosophy and specifically philosophy of science and epistemology, the consequence becomes that any claims of the existence of any entity of the form described above are by necessity unwarranted. In other words: religious beliefs are irrational.

This is hardly a controversial claim, but what might be somewhat controversial to some is that I exclude the irrational as undesirable. A statement such as that is bound to meet some opposition. Are there not feelings? And subjective opinions? And art? Are these things not irrational but desriable? The short answer is no. Rationality is simply not applicable to phenomena that are intrinsically subjective. An emotion can be neither rational nor irrational, it is something that arises through naturalistic means in the brain and this process can be studies and both rational and irrational statements can be made about it, but the emotion itself is something that is not the result of rational discourse in the agent experiencing it. It is not something that one experiences as the result of reasoning, and that disqualifies it from the labels of rationality and irrationality. Those labels are applicable for arguments, and any statement that is the conclusion of a not rationally based argument is irrational and always undesirable.

Of course, it’s inhuman and ridiculously unrealistic to demand that all people should be completely rational all the time, but it is reasonable to ask people not to institutionalize their irrationality, which brings us back to religion. There is no clearer example of institutionalized irrationality than religion.

Having covered very briefly some of my reasons for considering all religion as necessarily irrational and all irrationality as undesirable, one might want to move on to the uses and effects of religion. Some argue that even if it’s true that religious belief is irrational and that its claims are false, it might still be desirable, at least to some, because it gives comfort, because it fills a need. To answer this, I need to return to the concept of rationality and its use. The point of using a rational approach to reality is that it is what is most likely to let you actually connect with and understand reality as it actually is. Knowledge about reality is a necessary tool for being able to handle the events of reality: if you don’t understand how reality works and what outcomes are probable to arise from any given action, then you will be ill-equiped to decide upon a good course of action in any given situation. Rationality is not just an abstract intellectual ideal: it’s a necessary tool for well-being. Giving people the hope of some future state of affairs (life in heaven) which is not likely (to say the least) to actually exist at the cost of crippling them in their ability to handle the goings-on down here on earth is deeply immoral, which is why I consider religion to be not just the biggest enemy of intellectual discourse, but also the biggest enemy of humanity and human well-being.

Philosophical Statement

This is an article expressing my most basic views on philosophy and its role. It will be an ever evolving document, being updated as I find the time and inspiration and as my views change over time.

I’m a relative amateur in the field of philosophy, having studied it for a few years on and off (inbetween my studies in computer science) without getting too deep into any of its sub-fields. I have delved fairly deeply into logic and have otherwise focused somewhat on the philosophies of science and mind, and a little bit on philosophy of language (mostly in connection with logic through logical grammar).

With that out of the way, I can get a bit more into my view of philosophy and its connection to other fields of study. Much has been said about the relation between philosophy and science, Quine views them as being on a continuum and I sympathize with this, seeing the difference as being about the difference between impartially describing objective facts and building theories to explain them, and analyzing concepts, working out definitions, and reasoning about logical consequences of these definitions. Some would say that a characteristic of philosophy is its normative nature, but I am unconvinced that this is true. While some sub-fields of philosophy such as ethics are normative and (I would argue probably inescapably) subjective, I don’t see how normativity plays any major role in philosophy of language or logic, where questions seem to be about how the abstract constructions of language and logic connect with the real world, hardly a question of normativity but probably a question not possible to answer by empirical means. And perhaps this is the nature of philosophy: that it attempts to answer questions left untouched by empirical investigation, that it tries to answer how certain states of affair, which have been shown to exist by science, can be. Example: science shows that the external world is in a certain way, that it consist of entities of certain types, philosophy asks how it is that our experiences are connected to the external world, how it is possible that we can use our language to refer to things in the world. This is a loosely formulated hypothesis on the nature of philosophy which needs to be further developed.

Whatever the nature of philosophy is, whatever standpoint I will eventually take on the matter, I have an idea of how this question as well as all other questions of philosophy needs to be adressed. In the words of John Searle: An important starting point for any sane philosophy is realism, meaning that an external world exists where our conceptual constructs somehow are representations of things which have an objective existence in this external world, and a correspondence theory of truth, meaning that statements are true or false in virtue of being or not being in correspondence with matters of fact in the external world. These starting points seem unavoidable, but an argument for them will have to wait and will be dealt with in another article. Another important standpoint which is necessary for a sane investigation into reality is the scientific method augmented with philosophical discussion about the concepts arising from science (or perhaps it should rather be described as philosophical investigation informed by empirical findings from science). The scientific method is the way we have to test our hypotheses about the external world to make sure that there really is a correspondence between our statements and the world, and so, is the basis for our knowledge. Any theory of epistemology must hence be based on some understanding of the scientific method.

Finally, logic is an important part of philosophy (and science), being the way to clarify statements through translation into formal statements in some system of logic expressing propositions, and also the way to investigate arguments and draw conclusions. The scientific method is most commonly seen as being fundamentally a hypotethico-deductive method in which hypotheses are formulated in order to draw conclusions from them by deductive means so that we can use empirical means to test if the conclusions correspons to reality. In philosophy, the empirical plays a less central role but logic is still there to clarify our concepts and figure out the consequences of these. The result may not be, as in science, that the consequences are tested against reality through empirical means, but maybe are rather evaluated in the basis of whether the conclusions are desirable or not. Perhaps our intuitions about desirable consequences are central to this process, but perhaps this is not the case as some have argued against the central role of intuitions in philosophy.